'Just three Skittles in a bowl will kill you. Would you take a handful?' Evidence, Public Policy and Islamist-inspired Violent Extremism by Saggar, Shamit
 
 
‘Just three Skittles in a bowl will kill you. Would you take a handful?’ 1 
Evidence, Public Policy and Islamist-inspired Violent Extremism 
 
 
Shamit Saggar 
Institute for Social and Economic Research 
University of Essex 
 
 
E: ssaggar@essex.ac.uk 
T  +44 (0)1206 872864 
M: ISER, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ 
Twitter: @prof_saggar 
 
 
 
  
                                                      
1 Adapted from a Tweet by Donald J. Trump Junior posted 19 September 2016 
(deleted 28 September 2016) – available at: @DonaldJTrumpJnr (viewed 20 
September 2016). 
 2
ABSTRACT  This article is concerned with the use of evidence by the UK policy 
community to tackle Islamist-inspired terrorism. It focuses on how evidence for such 
terrorism is generated, interpreted and organized, and in particular pinpointing the 
challenges of reliability and prediction facing those with responsibility for tackling 
terrorism and its associated causes. Counter-terrorism policy is heavily exposed to 
risks of bias and distortion, but it is also vulnerable to various kinds of institutional 
group-think and vested interests. This article scrutinises three aspects of CT 
evidence-based policymaking. First, there are imperfections in the evidence base, 
mostly arising from data limitations and practical shortcomings. These include factual 
gaps in knowledge, difficulties in comparing evidence about Muslims with non-
Muslims, methodological weaknesses, and difficulties in measuring profoundly 
subjective feelings about alienation and grievance. Secondly, the scope of the 
problem to which policy is addressed (and the policy paradigms that are alluded to) 
shape the priorities placed on the evidence base. How much weight should be given 
to evidence about the narrative of oppression or dissent used by extremists? 
Background oppositional identities are extensively researched and yet policymakers 
may choose to concentrate instead on factors in the foreground that have to do with 
actual violent conspiracies. Thirdly, important nuances in the evidence-policy nexus 
arise from the implicit generalizations that are held by policymakers. Evidence 
describing the problem of terrorism is better accompanied by an appreciation of (and 
perhaps evidence about) the behavioural situation of decision-makers and decision-
making structures. This involves trade-offs, bargaining and accommodations to carry 
different constituencies, and has a bearing on the kind of evidence that is used in 
CT. The article closes with a discussion of the above distinctions, and concludes that 
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there is a risk of naivety in evidence-based policymaking that is not alive to the 
politics of radicalization and extremism. 
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‘Just three Skittles in a bowl will kill you. Would you take a handful?’ 
Evidence, Public Policy and Islamist-inspired Violent Extremism 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This article is concerned with the use of policy-relevant evidence by the UK policy 
community to tackle Islamist-inspired terrorism. It focuses on how evidence for such 
terrorism is generated, interpreted and organized, and in particular pinpointing the 
challenges of evidential reliability and predictive capacity that confront policymakers 
with responsibility for tackling terrorism and its associated causes. The conclusions 
are not limited to Islamist-inspired terrorism and can be extended to several aspects 
of far right-wing-inspired terrorism. 
 
Two decades of countering Islamist-inspired political extremism in western 
liberal democracies provides a significant source of experience and reflection, not 
least in terms of what is known about the motivation and behaviour of those involved 
in (and those thought to be personally or emotionally aligned with) acts of terrorism. 
In this period, governments have grappled with how best to respond to a range of 
political movements, organizations and ad hoc initiatives and their associated 
narratives, a small handful of which have succeeded in making a connection 
between a general agenda of grievance and oppositional identity, and political 
violence in some form. Almost all practical attempts to tackle such extremism and 
radicalization have come up against a familiar problem, namely penetrating and 
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making sense of the relationship between forms of non-violent dissent and the moral 
oxygen said to be sustaining specific violent conspiracies. 
 
Against this background, policymakers have been stretched in their use of 
policy instruments that directly bear down on the actions of violent conspirators. The 
proverbial gold standard for these instruments, if they are to have surgical precision, 
is their accuracy in pinpointing the characteristics of potential or imminent violence. It 
is not enough to equate danger with what is happening now because this can 
sometimes paint a misleading picture, usually because it is only populated by a thin 
layer of operational intelligence. It is necessary to account for the context as well: 
why and where it is happening, and why and where it is more likely to happen in the 
future. Policies to tackle terrorism therefore rely in some sense on a general theory 
of political violence. 
 
Obtaining a rich evidence base to explain the context in which such harm is 
conceived, planned and executed is the overarching policy objective. This is 
because it brings certain predictive qualities that can shape the policy measures to 
tackle such terrorism. And securing the breadth and depth of that evidence base is 
followed by another task, namely to ensure that evidence is appropriately interpreted 
to inform policy. This is the challenge facing such policymakers and analysts 
responsible for improving the evidence base. 
 
Counter-terrorism (CT) policy is especially layered with these challenges, and 
warrants a closer, shrewder look at the relationship between evidence and policy. CT 
is heavily exposed to risks of bias and distortion in terms of the measurement of 
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attitudes and behaviours, but it is also vulnerable to various kinds of institutional 
group-think and vested interests. This article argues that CT evidence-based 
policymaking is affected by three factors that require more formal scrutiny. First, 
there are various imperfections in the evidence base supporting policymakers, 
mostly arising from gaps in data and practical shortcomings. Secondly, the scope of 
the problem to which policy is addressed (and the policy paradigms that are alluded 
to) shape the priorities placed on the evidence base. Thirdly, the conceptual models 
that are used to explain the problem have an influence upon shared thinking about 
policy among those responsible for CT policymaking and operational matters. Each 
of these has a bearing on the kind of evidence that is generated, endorsed and 
deployed in tackling extremism and radicalization, with important implications for 
policy formulation, evaluation, borrowing and reform. 
 
 
Background and context 
  
The immediate, shared purpose of CT is twofold: to gather intelligence that is as 
sharply focused as possible on the practical aspects of violent plots, and to use this 
knowledge in a manner that disrupts an actual or imminent chain of events and 
possibly prevents future harmful events. This surgical way of working relies on 
precision and reliability in gathering and understanding evidence about the defined 
problem, and herein lie some initial problems. The most important of these is to 
avoid an over confidence in the model or its supporting evidence base.  For instance, 
one commentator has described this as a ‘boomerang effect’ (contrasting with a 
‘slingshot effect’): starting with one problem, the policy intervention narrowly misses 
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its target and only serves to create new problems in the form of fresh hostility and 
fears of casual harassment among a group.2  
 
The appetite to identify operational models that de-clutter the causes of such 
terrorism cannot be understated.  Furthermore, operational intelligence is rarely open 
to probing for long term quality assurance, and this can all to easily lead to an 
uneasiness about ad hoc approaches to CT policy. A key criticism is that it can serve 
to alienate vulnerable groups and people needlessly.3 There are important political 
ramifications for security-based and community-based policies to disrupt violence, 
and the most awkward of these in a liberal democracy is the maintenance of 
confidence in a system designed to sift men and women of violence from others. The 
success and failures of operational policies dominates the politics of public agencies’ 
relationships with western Muslim communities.     
 
There are problems in how evidence is used to inform policy. One of these is 
that the data used by researchers and policymakers on various aspects of terrorism 
lack common standards for assessment and comparison. This can give rise to 
unconscious biases in how evidence is collated. Sheehan for instance notes the 
early use of ‘small-n’ qualitative case studies, and in follow-on efforts to create ‘large-
                                                      
2 Shamit Saggar, ‘Boomerangs and slingshots: Radical Islamism and counter 
terrorism strategy’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies vol.35, no.3, 2009, 381-
402. 
3 Paul Gill, ‘Bombing Alone: Tracing the motivations and antecedent behaviours of 
lone-actor terrorists’, Journal of Forensic Sciences, vol.59, no.2, 2014, 425-435.  
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n’ quantitative data sets to test particular hypotheses, and argues that some of the 
latter have run into the same problems of ‘contextually sensitive judgements [about] 
coding’ that afflict the former.4 Thus, reliability may not be any greater as a result of 
substantial additional investments in data collection. This is further compounded by 
worries over ‘data supply chains’,5 such that none of this can be taken on trust – 
those producing data are potentially affected by their incentives, which then impacts 
on their independence from external pressures. 
 
An important sensitivity is the inherent risk that evidence can become 
undermined and corrupted, even unintentionally. For example, while the use of 
unattributed tip-offs is crucial to ensuring real-time responsiveness to ‘street-level’ 
risks, this necessarily means surveillance extending to law-abiding individuals who 
may hold serious misgivings about the impression of bias that these policies can 
lead to. And such impressions can slip into a general expectation of victimization and 
alienation.  With this concern in mind, a former UK Independent Reviewer of of 
Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson QC, has suggested that it is  
 
                                                      
4 Ivan Sheehan, ‘Assessing and Comparing Data Sources for Terrorism Research’, 
in Cynthia Lum and Leslie Kennedy (eds), Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Policy 
(New York: Springer-Verlag 2012), 13-40. 
5 Yoshiko Herrera and Devesh Kapur, ‘Improving Data Quality: Actors, incentives, 
and capabilities’, Political Analysis vol.15, 2007, 365–386.  
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legitimate for the state to scrutinize (and the citizen to inform upon) the 
exercise of core democratic freedoms by large numbers of law-abiding 
people. The benefits claimed…have to be weighed with the utmost care 
against the potential consequences, in terms of both inhibiting those freedoms 
and alienating those people.6 
 
This boils down to having greater certainty about what is known, and what can 
be inferred, about the steps to violent extremism. And since this phenomenon is 
constantly evolving, it is no surprise that such certainty is subject to review and 
iteration, and is also heavily exposed to allegations of ingrained bias against Muslim 
groups, as well as the reactions of critics to those allegations.7 
 
There is another tension, namely, how close to the problem of terrorism 
should policy interventions be situated? This dilemma has been a source of dispute, 
with some arguing that the root causes are scattered and lie far back in antagonistic 
values and practices, while others have stressed the need to concentrate on 
impacting moving parts that are known, traceable and tangible – background versus 
                                                      
6 David Anderson QC (Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation), Review of 
the Terrorism Acts in 2014, September 2015, para 9.31 – available at:   
https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Terrorism-Acts-Report-2015-Print-version.pdf (viewed 
12/4/17). 
7 Gillian Tett, ‘The real risks of keeping America safe’, Financial Times Magazine, 13 
February 2017. 
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foreground factors, as it were.8 In the UK, policy (notably the Prevent programme) 
has operated in both spheres and has tried, sometimes in vain, to make sharper-
than-plausible distinctions about the purpose and focus of particular policies. In 
2016, one junior minister, Karen Bradley MP, stressed to the Joint (Lords and 
Commons) Committee on Human Rights (but without persuasion, it would seem), 
that:  
 
The Prevent strategy is part of our counter-terrorism strategy. That is not the 
same as the counter-extremism strategy, because extremism is wider than 
terrorism. It is hate crime and the other harms that can be caused to society 
by the promotion of ideology that leads to harm.9 
   
In identifying an oppositional ideology as the policy problem, the choice of 
policy instruments in response includes challenging ideologies and value systems 
that sustain (perhaps unknowingly) a grievance agenda. The idea is to go backwards 
in order to go forwards – if it is possible to do so – and this insight is a common 
feature of many policy areas such as tackling drug abuse, rising obesity and sexual 
transmitted diseases. In this case, it means successfully reducing the underlying 
                                                      
8 Paul Gill, ‘Towards a Scientific Approach to Identifying and Understanding 
Indicators of Radicalization and Terrorist Intent: Eight Key Problems’ – available at: 
http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1482248/1/Gill-P_Commentary_v1.pdf (viewed 12/4/17) 
9 House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
Counter-Extremism, Second Report of Session 2016–17, para 39. 
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support for extremism as a means of undermining the softer, support capabilities of 
would-be terrorists. In reptilian terms, it is a deliberate exercise to reorder resources 
to go beyond beating back hungry crocodiles. The focus instead is on the swamp 
and how this might be drained of equally hungry predators.  
 
This clichéd and cumbersome metaphor nevertheless shows the spectrum 
across which counter extremism, counter radicalization and counter terrorism 
operates. By concentrating on the causes, there is a need to develop an approach to 
evidence that is equally robust and involves knowledge about who supports violence, 
who does not, the complex interplay between these sometimes misleading 
categories, and accounting for counterfactuals such as when support for extremism 
does not drive violence. Even by restricting analysis to those engaged in acts directly 
preparatory to violence, what is known about how this happens remains sketchy,10 
although more robust data draws on background factors that influence individual 
motivation and collective narratives of oppression.11  
 
One definition of the policy problem holds that a very small minority of western 
Muslims subscribe to violent conspiracies. They are the proverbial bad apples in the 
barrel, and the task is to measure their whereabouts and intent, so as to disrupt and 
prevent, or prosecute and deter. A decade ago, former head of MI5, Jonathan 
                                                      
10 John Alderdice, ‘The individual, the group and the psychology of terrorism’, 
International Review of Psychiatry, vol.19, no.3, 2007, 201-09. 
11 Richard Perl, Combating Terrorism: The challenge of measuring effectiveness, 
(Washington DC: CRS Report for Congress 2007). 
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Evans, declared on the record that around 2,000 individuals posed this kind of 
known threat at any one time.12 A contrasting definition points to a range of 
sentiment within Muslim groups, some of whom share hard-line grievances and 
sympathies for violence, perhaps internalised as self-defence, and fuelled by policies 
that appear to tar all Muslims as would-be terrorists or terrorism-apologists.13 The 
difficulty of ensuring surgical precision in operationalizing the former model are well 
known, while the latter (employing some Muslims as a source of surveillance on 
others) can be a queasy task in practice. 
 
Behind these models there are sharply contrasting world views of the values 
and norms that might be fuelling antipathy and suspicion. Some can be attributed to 
the effects of scrutiny and surveillance, but some of this is caught up in feelings of 
alienation towards western secularism, political institutions, lifestyle patterns, 
overlapping with mixed sentiments about the end of colonialism.14 They pose serious 
measurement issues, starting with agreeing a robust way of comparing various kinds 
                                                      
12 Jonathan Evans, Speech to the Society of Editors, Manchester, 5 November 2007 
– available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/nov/05/terrorism.world (viewed 
12/4/17). 
13 Shamit Saggar, Pariah Politics: Understanding Western Radical Islamism and 
What Should Be Done, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010). 
14 Ameer Ali, ‘From Islamophobia to Westophobia: The long road to radical 
Islamism’, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, vol.3, no.1, 2016, 1-19. 
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of disadvantage that affects Muslims and non-Muslims alike.15 Going back to 
swamp-drainers, the task of tackling hard-line opinion, even where peacefully 
expressed, is seen as a legitimate goal among neo-conservatives.16 By contrast, 
their more pragmatically-minded opponents hold that such a strategy of ‘draining the 
swamp’ is dangerously counter-productive: it risks alienating Muslims further, and is 
in any case an impractical proposition because non-violent extremism is so 
subjective as to be politically undefinable and liable to fuel repressive state action.17 
 
 
The parameters of evidence-based public policy 
By concentrating on currently active plots and on the pipeline of probable such plots, 
CT policy operates in the foreground of a much larger set of issues. These involve 
the challenges of long-term integration of discrete minorities, balancing secular and 
faith-based values, handling ‘homeland’ foreign policy tensions, and managing 
safeguards on democratic free expression. The first of these have been the subject 
                                                      
15 Jean Martin, Anthony Heath and Karin Bosveld, ‘Is ethnicity or religion more 
important in explaining inequalities in the labour market?, Sociology Working Papers, 
Paper Number 2010-02 – available at: 
http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/2010-02.pdf (viewed 12/4/17). 
16 Robin Simcox, ‘We Will Conquer Your Rome’: A Study of Islamic State Terror 
Plots in the West (London: Henry Jackson Society 2015). 
17 Clive Walker, Terrorism and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011). 
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of significant government interest recently, with a claim that a palpable lack of 
integration has created a fertile environment for extremism. Thus, according to the 
high profile Casey Review of December 2016:18 
Resilience, integration and shared common values and behaviours – such as 
respect for the rule of law, democracy, equality and tolerance – are inhibitors 
of division, hate and extremism.  
It is worth pausing on some newer findings. One of these has been that the 
pace and nature of radicalization may be dramatically accelerated and altered in 
certain circumstances involving western females.19 Another is that the overlap 
between the crime-terror nexus has been under-estimated.20 And another is that 
                                                      
18 The Casey Review – A report into Opportunity and Integration (London: 
Department of Local Government and Communities 2016), p.8 – available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/57597
3/The_Casey_Review_Report.pdf (viewed 12/4/17). 
19 ‘Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’ - Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon (London: 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence/Institute for 
Strategic Dialogue 2015) – available at: http://icsr.info/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_Phen
omenon.pdf (viewed 12/4/17). 
20 Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror 
Nexus (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political 
Violence 2016) – available at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ICSR-
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analysis of lone-actor terrorism highlights a new capacity to avoid tripwires that can 
alert the authorities.21 Existing understandings about the role of the state and by the 
interplay between collective identities and loyalties adds further colour. Social 
conservatives place emphasis on state responsibility to protect individual and 
societal security,22 and this creates an implicit expectation that CT policies must 
work with what evidence they have, whatever shortcomings there might be in 
specific targeting of violent extremism. This realisation echoes among commentators 
on the right who express scepticism about the general reliability of social science-
derived evidence, and also towards generalized theories of human behaviour and 
the scientific positivism on which many of these are based.23 Meanwhile, social 
liberals, starting from a perspective towards state involvement in and responsibility 
for domestic security, show their own caution in the face of this trade-off, sensing 
reputational damage from poorly targeted surveillance and preferring to accept a 
much higher threshold of direct evidence before intervening.24 In both cases, there 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Report-Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist-Futures-European-Jihadists-and-the-New-Crime-
Terror-Nexus.pdf (viewed 12/4/17). 
21 Clare Ellis et. al., Lone-Actor Terrorism Analysis Paper, Countering Lone-Actor 
Terrorism Series No. 4 (London: RUSI 2016). 
22 Peter Osborne, ‘Islam and the British Conservative Tradition’, University of Bristol 
lecture, 17 November 2016. 
23 Peter Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2003). 
24 Martin Innis, ‘Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror Through Community 
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are contrasting expectations about the kind and level of evidence that is desirable 
(and attainable). 
 
Imperfections and interruptions 
 
The role of evidence in CT is undoubtedly affected by the big and small frames 
within which policy problems are identified, but is also impacted by a number of 
smaller factors that stem from how political and policy preferences are structurally 
organized. The following factors in particular impinge on the evidence base: 
 
Technical feasibility and methodological reliability. Caveats about generalizations are 
commonplace in social science research on terrorism,25 especially studies examining 
interlocking aspects of socio-economic circumstances and psychological, emotional, 
faith and political identities.26 In the case of distinct religious minorities in the UK, 
research has been developed comparatively recently based on a collection of direct 
and indirect measures of group membership (a direct religious identity question 
appeared for the first time in the 2001 General Census). In many survey-based 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Intelligence and Democratic Policing’, Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, vol.605, 2006, 222-26.  
25 Paul K. David and Kim Cragin (eds), Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting 
the Pieces Together (Santa Monica: RAND 2009).  
26 Dinesh Bhugra, Antonio Ventriglio and Kamaldeep Bhui, ‘Acculturation, violent 
radicalization, and religious fundamentalism’, The Lancet Psychiatry, vol.4, no.3, 
2017, 179-181. 
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studies small sample sizes have led to data limitations, and the need to aggregate 
the experience of otherwise distinctive sub-groups. For example, British Muslims 
from an Indian background are rarely examined separately from those with Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi origins, although there is arguably a compelling case based on 
empirical findings that disaggregate this particular religious minority.27 Data reliability 
is further hampered by large-scale survey methodology that uses random sampling 
of minority population groups in areas of residential concentration, with limited 
understanding beyond these core locations.28 
 
Some of these limitations of quantitative research are also found in qualitative 
work that seeks to provide a more nuanced account using intra-group disaggregation 
to describe of the dynamics of subjective experience and sentiment. An important 
aspect of this has been the question of situating and contextualising Islam and 
Islamic identity in a pluralist western setting, and pushes against the basic idea of a 
Muslim ‘community’. According to GhaneaBassiri: 
 
                                                      
27 Simonetta Longhi, Chetti Nicoletti and Lucinda Platt, ‘Explained and unexplained 
wage gaps across the main ethno-religious groups in Great Britain’, Oxford 
Economic Papers, vol.65, no.2, 2013, 471–93. 
28 David Voas, ‘Surveys of Behaviour, Beliefs and Affiliation’, in James Beckford and 
N. Jay Demerath (eds), Handbook of the Sociology of Religion (Thousand Oaks, CA:  
2007), 128‐150. 
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[There is] no monolithic Muslim community but Muslim communities with 
varying visions of Islam that stand pluralistically in relation to one another as 
well as to non-Muslim communities.29  
 
Despite several notions of western Muslim identity, there remains a need to provide 
a convincing account of collective faith-based identity that transcends national and 
other considerations.30 
 
As regards evidence for tacit support for extremism, a key empirical insight is 
that such support is both knowingly and unknowingly given. Survey data frequently 
points to significant numbers of Muslims who report some sympathy for the goals of 
violent extremism, sometimes appearing equivocal about disrupting terrorism and 
involving law enforcement agencies.31 There two problems, however: failing to 
provide an informed comparator (comparable feelings might be found in a non-
Muslim sample), and a lack of a contextual interpretation for the intensity of feelings 
said to support violence (perhaps fuelled by CT focusing on Muslims exclusively). 
 
                                                      
29 Kambiz GhaneaBassiri, ‘Writing Histories of Western Muslims’, Review of Middle 
Eastern Studies (special edition, Researching Western Muslims), vol.46, no.2, 2012, 
169-78. 
30 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, The West and the Challenges of Modernity (Leicester: 
Islamic Foundation, 2004, 2nd edn). 
31 Maria Sobolewska, ‘Religious extremism in Britain and British Muslims’, in Roger 
Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin (eds), The New Extremism in 21st Century Britain 
(Abingdon Oxon: Routledge 2010). 
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Gaps in knowledge. What is known about Western Muslim minorities has mostly 
appeared in the past decade or two, and there remain some substantial gaps in 
knowledge that are beginning to be addressed systematically. One example is the 
relationship between spatial segregation and social trust.32 But, despite small 
pockets of scholarship, comparatively little is known about the factors that drive 
individual and collective religious identity and span ethnic, linguistic and national 
boundaries,33 ideas of secularism within non-western Islamist thinking,34 and how 
foreign affairs shape minority and majority attitudes and might fuel militancy.35 These 
are important pieces of the puzzle for policymakers struggling to distinguish between 
the various research design reasons that limit their understanding. These can range 
                                                      
32 Eric Uslaner, Segregation and Mistrust: Diversity, Isolation and Social Cohesion, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press 2012); Anthony Heath and Neli Demireva, 
‘Has multiculturalism failed in Britain?’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol.37, no.1, 2014, 
161-180. 
33 David Voas and Fenella Fleischmann, ‘Islam Moves West: Religious Change in 
the First and Second Generations’, Annual Review of Sociology, vol.38, no.1, 2012, 
525–545. 
34 Humeira Iqtidar, Secularising Islamists? Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamaat-ud-Dawa in 
Pakistan, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2011). 
35 Stephen Fisher, Anthony Heath, David Sanders and Maria Sobolewska, ‘Ethnicity, 
religion and support for the war in Afghanistan’, paper presented at the 2011 annual 
Elections, Public Opinion and Parties annual conference. 
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from an inability to tap into strength of feeling about foreign policy matters,36 to 
outdated ways of coding religious group membership and faith-based identity.37 
 
Such doubts are not unique to CT policy. They are in common with several 
other policy areas and in particular the so-called ‘wicked issues’ that governments 
face that are long-term and complex in nature, packed with large numbers of moving 
parts, and test the scope and limits of state action. A prominent example is climate 
change (posing much greater risks to the general public and yet is ranked lower than 
terrorism in the public’s mind), which is burdened by an over-supply of scientific data, 
and the ‘amplification’ of risk by prominent ‘public science champions’.38 
  
Meaningful comparators. There are two aspects of the comparator problem. The first 
is a half-full-versus-half-empty conundrum. For example, a UK national newspaper, 
The Daily Mail, published findings from a ComRes poll in 2015 highlighting that 27 
per cent of British Muslims held ‘some sympathy for the motives behind the Charlie 
Hebdo attacks’ in Paris (alongside 11 per cent who were ‘sympathetic to those 
                                                      
36 Andrew Blick, Tufyal Choudhary and Stuart Weir, The Rules of the Game (York: 
Rowntree Foundation 2007). 
37 Jörg Stolz, ‘Explaining Islamophobia: A Test of Four Theories Based on the Case 
of a Swiss City’, Swiss Journal of Sociology, vol.3, no.3, 2005, 547-66.  
38 Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree About Climate Change: Understanding 
controversy, inaction and opportunity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2009). 
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wanting to fight against Western interests’).39 The larger story promoted by the 
newspaper went further. This dwelt on the reaction of others (including the BBC and 
Muslim campaign bodies such as the Islamic Human Rights Commission) who 
stressed the poll’s finding that most Muslims opposed those wanting to fight against 
Western interests. In others words, this is a common example of polling evidence 
supporting both characterizations. 
 
The second complication arises when judging factual statements about 
Muslims in comparison with non-Muslims. Many stand-alone such studies lack a 
built-in reference point either from the larger society or from relevant strata within 
society. Thus, we know that certain proportions of young western Muslim men do not 
condemn all forms of political violence, but this can only matter if it is more (or less) 
common among this group than among young men generally.40 There are potentially 
significant comparisons to be drawn with, say, young Indian men or with young black 
men (both mostly non-Muslim) which affects the frame within which the dominant 
‘Muslim story’ is set. Without useful comparison points, there is a risk of losing 
                                                      
39 Available at: http://www.comresglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/BBC-
Today-Programme_British-Muslims-Poll_FINAL-Tables_Feb2015.pdf  (viewed 
12/4/17). 
40 Amy Nivette, Manuel Eisner and Denis Ribeaud, ‘Developmental Predictors of 
Violent Extremist Attitudes: A Test of General Strain Theory’, Journal of Research in 
Crime and Delinquency, 2017, vo.54, no.6, 755-90. 
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contextual understanding of the kind that is vital for CT purposes, and also for wider 
social and economic integration.41 
 
Evidential continuity and causal inferences. The degree to which a continuous body 
of evidence is available to policy-makers matters. Arguably longitudinal analysis is 
the gold standard as this provides an ability to map many more moving parts thought 
to influence particular outcomes or behaviours. Continuous cross-sectional survey 
research can also be used to replicate these potential insights. Very few such 
longitudinal analyses have been carried out42 although some are focused on a wider 
set of issues such as racial or religious harassment or health outcomes.43 The risk 
with relying on stand-alone snapshot studies is that knowledge about changing or 
continuous individual and household circumstances is lost. An example of this can 
be seen in the educational and socio-economic rise of British Bangladeshis.44 This 
                                                      
41 Anthony Heath, ‘Six theses on Muslim integration (plus reply from David 
Goodhart)’, 2015 – available at: https://www.integrationhub.net/six-theses-on-
muslim-integration/ (viewed 12/4/17). 
42 Richard Berthoud and Morten Blekesaune, Persistent Employment Disadvantage, 
esp ch.3, Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 416 (London: 
HMSO 2007). 
43 Alita Nandi et. al., Ethnic and racial harassment and mental health: Identifying 
sources of resilience (Colchester: ISER Working Paper No. 2016-14 2016). 
 
44 Raya Muttarak, ‘Generation, ethnic and religious diversity in friendship choice: 
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large (and overwhelmingly Muslim) group has started to experience upward mobility 
in the past ten years, albeit from a low base, but research throws scarcely any light 
on related attitudes and opinions within this group towards Muslim identity, global 
Islam and group cohesion.45 
 
Subjective and objectives lenses. Internalized, collective grievance that spills over 
into oppositional culture, is something that is not easily penetrated by social 
research. And yet many agree that this narrative runs through Islamist-inspired 
extremism, often underscored by a sense of humiliation:46 
 
Muslims are acutely aware that they belong to a world civilization with great 
influence in the past and are today again a large presence in the world. Their 
anger and frustration stems from the fact that in spite of the splendour of the 
past…they seem powerless in the face of attacks on their honour and dignity.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
exploring inter-ethnic close ties in Britain’, Ethnic and Racial Studies vol.37, no.1, 
2014, 71-98. 
 
45 The Economist, ‘Breaking out’, 21 February 2015, 25-6 
 
46 Akbar Ahmed, Submission to the Commonwealth Commission on Respect and 
Understanding (London: Commonwealth Secretariat 2007) – quoted in Shamit 
Saggar, ‘Boomerangs and Slingshots’, 390. 
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The above characterization is set in a frame that is only loosely connected to the 
objective empirical reality that focuses the work of researchers interested in patterns 
of systematic social exclusion affecting western Muslim groups.47 There are robust 
measures of geographic dispersal, dilution of social disadvantage, enhanced 
educational attainment and even cross-ethnic and cross-religious friendships – 
where these occur. It is much less clear what is to be made of these circumstances, 
however well-evidenced. There is little suggestion that exclusion and even alienation 
directly affects affinity with religious identity. Research has generally not delved 
deeply into the drivers of Muslim collective identity and consciousness beyond noting 
that religious self-identity has grown more, on average, among many western Muslim 
groups than almost all other religious identities. But that does not say a great deal 
about causality since Muslims may sense that they are surrounded by a more hostile 
secular climate than before, which is very different from objectively greater 
secularism. 
 
Inter-disciplinary insights. The part played by subjective feelings is less clear since 
the factors behind powerlessness and rage are caught in a more unstable vortex. 
These can be rooted in notorious acts of injustice and loss of dignity in the past, 
recreated as:48 
                                                      
47 Justin Gest, ‘Western Muslim integration’, Review of Middle Eastern Studies 
(special edition, Researching Western Muslims), vol.46, no.2, 2012, 189-98. 
48 Commonwealth Secretariat, Civil Paths to Peace: Report of the Commonwealth 
Commission on Respect and Understanding (London: Commonwealth Secretariat 
2007), 39-40. 
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…deep-seated feelings of anger and disrespect that continue to live on in the 
minds of later generations that cannot have been directly affected [and which] 
portray the other in a wholly negative light, divesting them of any moral 
authority or legitimacy. 
 
This is an acute problem for policymakers. At one level, as noted, it is wise to 
be cautious about known social exclusion as a contributory factor behind extremism 
and radicalization. However, the established facts of exclusion are also known to 
feature in a political narrative of oppression and moral exceptionalism. At another 
level, a much larger factor appears to be the call by extremists to others to subscribe 
to a common goal, namely the ‘righting of a wrong’. This is a generalized sentiment 
that is hard to quantify through conventional survey research, and may be typically 
found on internet chatrooms that are aimed at an already-part receptive audience.  
 
Social psychology as well as social psychiatry are two likely disciplinary 
perspectives to tease out how a broad call to allegiance on behalf of a group triggers 
a more specific form of support for direct action and violent confrontation. The 
particular gap in evidence is the degree to which western Muslims are both in 
despair about collectively held grievances and feel a loss of patience with 
mainstream routes to redress. The failure to find a solution to Palestinian losses 
since 1948 and 1967, or to the Iraqi and Syrian conflicts post 2003, are prime 
examples. 
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Aligning evidence to the scope of the policy problem 
 
There are significantly different conceptualizations of the CT policy problem. For 
instance, the problem can be set at a high and broad level that emphasises the end-
to-end narratives developed and used by extremists, how these can take root and 
their implications. This narrative comprises many areas of criticism of and 
antagonism towards western societies and governments, ranging from 
condemnation of violence, issues of secularism, family structures, the role of women 
and foreign policy.49 Moreover, it is reinforced by fears that security and intelligence 
agencies are in the business of recruiting Muslims to spy on fellow Muslims.50 The 
point is that this is a very large canvass.  
 
Some areas are accompanied by issues of dissent.51 For example, the UK 
Government came in for criticism by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in July 
2016, arguing that a proposed new law to criminalise non-violent extremism would 
                                                      
49 Michael Arthur, ‘The global challenge of terrorism’, Speech to the Indian Supreme 
Court Bar Association, New Delhi, 9 November 2005. 
50 Sahar F. Aziz, ‘Policing Terrorists in the Community’, Harvard National Security 
Journal, vol.5, 2014, 147-224.  
51 Muslim Council of Britain, Written evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee, 
8 July 2004 – see: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmhaff/886/886we08.h
tm (viewed 12/4/17).  
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be unworkable.52 The Committee cited a lack of a definition of the action the 
proposed law was intended to curb as the single biggest flaw in the approach. One 
commentator noted: ‘The current definition of extremism will catch the terrorist with 
an underhand intent but also the sceptical non-believer.’53 Simply put, the worry was 
that such a measure would create a new category dubbed as thought criminals. This 
alludes to the hotly disputed question of how and where violence is raised as an 
option or is seen as acceptable, not least by those who have suggested that there is 
a form of group-wide equivocation in response.54 It is unclear what the underlying 
evidence is for such a position.55 It may be that the condoning of violent methods is 
apparent but that it is also buried in a number of constructions of oppositional 
identity.  
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A rather different view of the policy problem centres on tolerating extremism. 
This Faustian Pact (as it is seen) holds that extremism that is not overtly violent 
remains self-contained. In this sense, the UK came to be seen as a host for various 
extremist individuals and movements since the 1990s (‘Londonistan’ in the 
shorthand critique), contrasting with the more muscular approach taken by the 
French authorities towards extremism from that point onwards.56 Furthermore, the 
conflict in question is not a total-war type, and nor is it permanent or involve a 
universal area-of-conflict. David Kilcullen’s The Accidential Geurrilla points out that 
many of the small, localized conflicts that take place are nested within a much larger 
‘big war’. Without an appreciation of counter-insurgence, he concludes, that the 
problem will be incorrectly framed:57 
 
Counter-terrorism…focuses on the enemy: the individual terrorist and the 
network of terrorist operatives. It seeks to destroy this network, proceeding 
from the assumption that removing the network removes the problem. In this 
sense, like most conventional warfare, it is ‘enemy-centric.’ On the other 
hand, counter-insurgency…has much older roots in imperial policing and 
colonial small wars [and] is ‘population-centric.’ Its basic assumption is that 
insurgency is a mass social phenomenon, that the enemy rides and 
                                                      
56 Reuel Marc Gerecht and Gary Schmitt, France: Europe’s Counterterrorist 
Powerhouse (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute European Outlook 3 
2007); John Bowen, Can Islam Be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a 
Secularist State (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2010). 
57 David Kilcullen, The Accidential Geurrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a 
Big One (New York: Oxford University Press 2006), xv. 
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manipulates a social wave consisting of genuine popular grievances, and that 
dealing with this broader social and political dynamic…is the most promising 
path to ultimately resolve the problem.  
 
The French experience is said to have deliberately set out to disrupt 
extremists’ day-to-day activities in order to reduce the chances of a universal 
oppositional narrative taking hold. But the bind lies in what it has led to: the approach 
may have unintentionally reinforced the narrative of oppression,58 painting the 
French state as the aggressor.59 The state of crisis in France over terrorism in the 
two year run-up to the 2107 Presidential election certainly opens up a debate about 
the effectiveness of the approach. ‘In view of the succession of appalling attacks in 
France, it has not done them much good’, wrote one commentator.60 
 
Understanding of the problem, thus, shapes what follows in terms of evidence 
to inform policy. At one end, there is a suggestion that a near-comprehensive 
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understanding of causal factors for downstream behaviour is attainable. At the other 
end, there are generalizations that deliberately dampen confidence in any and all 
forms of evidence cited as relevant. Infamously, the late Denis Healey, a former UK 
Chancellor, retold the story of an interviewer from a polling company who had 
unashamedly self-completed survey questions in a railway carriage in full view of 
others. His anecdote was to cast doubt on the method as opposed to the data itself. 
Notwithstanding his experience, a more reasoned basis for caution centres on the 
level of transparency that governs evidence gathering methods using social 
surveys.61 
 
Two examples can be used to illustrate the distance between these two 
points. The first is the highly charged analogy (repeated in the title of this article) 
drawn by Donald Trump (Junior) between Skittles and Syrian refugees. In this 
simplistic yet widely intuitive model, the challenge is to identify - swiftly and 
unambiguously – small numbers of individuals within a much larger group that can 
potentially cause harm. However, this is difficult because the manifestation of future 
harm is disguised, sometimes bordering on being undetectable. Moreover, the 
population within which the alleged harm emanates is moving (the flow of Syrian 
refugees seeking to enter western democracies (up to a million in Germany’s case in 
2015-16), and the underlying population of displaced Syrians (one in three left their 
homes during the conflict)). The risk calculus is muddied to say the least, so it is no 
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surprise that confidence levels in evidence plummet. So a precautionary principle 
should be to try to eliminate (or at least isolate) the risk altogether by eradicating any 
possibility of the population group entering the larger US population (Trump’s point). 
This may be a draconian and irrational reaction, for sure. But it is also portrayed as a 
prudent one that takes risk management seriously and to its limits: avoiding a small 
likelihood of something with a big impact is preferred if such an option is available. 
(The small known risk can alternatively placed alongside the risks of other harms: for 
example, in 2005 the UK’s then-Chief Scientific Advisor, David King, publicly stated 
that the risks of climate change outweighed those of terrorism.)62 
 
A further example of a long-standing evidence gap is the role of female 
terrorists. Western states facing Islamist radicalism have had little experience of 
anything other than ‘men of violence’. Indeed, Muslim-men-as-potential-terrorists has 
been sown into a dominant narrative for a long period. The attacks in New York in 
2001, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, and more recently in Paris (2015) and Berlin 
(2016), all reinforced this frame, and not surprisingly policymakers have pursued 
strategies that have not questioned this assumption. The strategy to apprehend 
those intent on harm has thus concentrated on small groups of relatively young men 
operating either at the behest of a male ringmaster or autonomously as franchise 
holders of a tightly knit group. Female participation has been thought to be minimal 
and limited to an ancillary role.  
 
                                                      
62 Quoted in BBC, ‘Global Warming “Biggest Threat”’ – available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/3381425.stm (viewed 12/4/17). 
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This frame is potentially flawed in two ways. The first is that women can be 
better terrorism assets to deploy than men simply because they have a lower, ‘on-
average’, risk profile to start with. This has been a tactical ploy of various terrorism 
campaigns in the past such as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and also in Israel-
Palestine where widows have been tasked with avenging the fall of their husbands. 
The second flaw is subtler, and notes that women as much as men are likely to be 
involved in providing tacit support in plotting terrorist attacks. This circle of implicit 
backing can provide both logistical assistance as well as moral oxygen. The 
evidence frame of who is recruited and how this happens has barely touched on 
women’s direct and indirect roles,63 allowing a CT policy lacuna to develop.  
In the UK, this lacuna has been filled by a think-tank, the Institute for Strategic 
Dialogue. In 2014 ISD successfully launched a dedicated programme on Women 
and Extremism which included a database of the social media postings of western 
female recruits to ISIS.64 This has rapidly become a rich tool to gather otherwise 
disparate evidence about their experience in recruiting others. The series concluded 
that ‘although often assumed to be passive agents, women have played significant 
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roles in a number of contemporary terrorist organizations.’65 In the subsequent 
period, efforts have been made to address this gap. The task has been aided, 
somewhat ironically, by the spectre of Samantha Lewthwaite, the widow of Germaine 
Lindsay (one of the four who carried out the 7 July 2005 attacks in central London). 
Lewthwaite has gone on to be a significant suspected terrorist in her own right 
(dubbed the ‘White Widow’ by the press), and has created something of a special 
status to appeal to young women.  
The is part of a much broader pivot in the evidence base that seeks to be 
more responsive to new developments and feedback (why keep looking for 
hardened young male extremists when there are others in the pipeline who do not 
match this profile?) And it is a reflection of how nimble policymakers are in making 
use of evidence that remains limited as a predictive tool. Developing capacity and 
capability to do these things is a familiar institutional challenge for the many public 
agencies established to tackle harm.66 
  
 
Conceptual models for explaining policymakers’ shared thinking 
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Decisions about the type of evidence to gather and how this is to be used for CT 
purposes are set in the context of how we explain the work of policymakers, their 
relationships with researchers, and their responses to an imperfect picture of the 
causes of problems that they are seeking to remedy. Policymakers themselves may 
be understandably sceptical that sufficient evidence can be gathered in such a 
multifaceted field as CT. The moving parts involved are numerous and the 
interaction between only a small fraction of these is understood. So it is prudent to 
build the evidence base in a series of both thin and thick iterative layers. But it is also 
shrewd given the complexity of the phenomenon, finite resources and political 
willpower. To be sure, policy failure tests is whether to abandon what is known in 
general on the basis of what is discovered in a specific case. Taking the earlier 
example, Lewthwaite’s links with more than one conspiracy did not change the fact 
that most suspects are male. Erratic changes can devastate curation of an evidence 
base that stands the test of time. 
 
Obstacles and opportunities for evidence-based public policy arise from the 
implicit generalizations that are held by policymakers. In other words, this approach 
is not directly concerned with describing the problem but rather with the behavioural 
situation of decision-makers and decision-making structures. It draws on a significant 
body of research among students of business and organizational dynamics who are 
similarly interested in cultural influences on decisions and behaviour, and has been 
taken up among students of governmental machinery interested in shared thinking 
and norms among policy actors. Such literatures have examined, inter alia, the role 
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of dominant ideas and hierarchies in public expenditure,67 bureaucratic 
understanding of social movements and terrorism,68 the rise of dominant political and 
scientific communities,69 and discourses on diversity and equality found within 
management research itself.70 Writing about the first of these, Parry describes how 
such a dry topic as the public administration of public expenditure, despite 
appearances, manages to yield an incisive look into an eco-system of values and 
shared assumptions that influence decision-making: 
 
The clue is the often-overlooked, and not very sparkling, subtitle 'Community 
and Policy Inside British Politics'. This betokens a work of sociology, shading 
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into anthropology: a study of human behaviour within a legal and political 
framework, rather than of the framework itself. (Italics added.)71 
 
The idea of a conceptual lens through which issues are collectively 
understood by policymaking communities is a familiar political science tool. It was 
most effectively articulated by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow’s study of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, Essence of Decision.72 Essence alerts us to the ways in which 
particular decisions and policy directions are not adequately explained by the 
objective evidence before policymaker alone – by ‘exploring the fundamental yet 
often unnoticed choices among the categories and assumptions that channel our 
thinking about problems’.73  
 
Objective evidence is not unimportant, but it contained within this conceptual 
lens. And the lens conditions assumptions about what is important, what is 
achievable, what is permissible and, also, crucially, what can be lived with. So it 
helps explains policy that is ‘good enough’ rather than ‘optimal’; hence, it describes 
good policy as that which is acceptable, both in terms of buy-in among members of 
the policy community and the consent of individuals and groups affected by its 
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practical measures.74 Meanwhile, as seasoned policymakers know, that they must 
manage the politics of what is achievable. As Adam Schiff, a senior member of the 
US House Intelligence Committee, noted in 2015: 
 
There are reportedly 700,000 to a million names on the US terrorism watch 
list alone. To track all of these potential threats, here or abroad, while taking 
time to gain additional intelligence, is unrealistic.75 
  
Essence employs distinctions between rational actor, organization behaviour 
and governmental politics models in explaining how and why the same evidence 
might be very differently understood and marshalled between these frames. In one 
setting, evidence is the authentic partner of rational decision-makers who want to 
know why something is happening in terms of the objectively-defined goals and 
interests of affected parties. To take a familiar example, evidence is rationally sought 
illustrating the degree of extremist sentiment on a particular university campus. In 
another setting, however, knowledge of this kind is not sufficient, and is 
supplemented by understanding of how bureaucracies function, adapt, co-opt and 
even think institutionally, and how they produce outputs that follow a pattern and 
become part of what is at stake. Thus, the original evidence insufficiently explains 
what is happening within such a university’s management and collegiate structures. 
                                                      
74 Peter Clarke, ‘Learning from Experience – Counter Terrorism in the UK since 
9/11’, Speech to Policy Exchange, 24 April 2007 – available at: 
http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-02228.pdf (viewed 12/4/17). 
75 Quoted in ‘Arrest of 2 men in Brooklyn highlights new challenges in fighting ISIS’, 
The New York Times, 1 March 2015, 15. 
 39
And in a further setting, attention switches to political bargains and accommodations 
that accompany policy decisions, and this implies the need to understand which or 
whose interests are affected, and then place this additional knowledge within a wider 
understanding of political trade-offs and compromises. Hence, there is a need for 
fresh evidence to account for the behaviour of individuals and groups within these 
structures. Specific decisions may appear sub-optimal, not due to a lack of resources 
but rather because they must ‘carry’ – i.e. not alienate – the largest possible 
constituency of relevant interests. 
 
What does this mean for evidence for CT purposes? We start by examining 
objective evidence regarding a single conspiracy and the conspirators’ sense of 
advancing their interests through a successful attack (i.e. who is most gripped by the 
violent extremist narrative and able to act on it?) We then move to consider the 
policies and measures put in place to detect and disrupt such a plot that must also 
accurately read the interests of, and constraints on, those who must respond to this 
knowledge. Such measures are owned by particular organizations variously 
accountable for their outcomes. The decision to raid a number of properties is an 
example of a measure sanctioned using evidence-based assessments (i.e. how 
advanced has a plot become and what is the trade-off between interception and 
further intelligence gathering?) How particular organizations deploy scarce resources 
in this scenario is revealing, and they may be required from time to time to make 
commitments involuntarily. Because they think and act as organizations, it is 
necessary to use this frame of reference in observing and assessing their actions 
and inactions. Finally, we need to factor in the political and power interests of those 
involved. They are engaged in some form of collective ‘game’ with accompanying 
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trade-offs, whose players individually and collectively will have a stake in evidence 
about the policy problem that vindicates the bargaining position that they have taken. 
 
Together organizational behaviour and governmental politics theories also 
reveal how the rational actor view of decision-making becomes muddied. And this 
raises the question of how evidence is mobilized to reinforce particular conceptual 
models. These conceptual models cut across what is at stake externally in society 
and internally within government. The implication is that the relationship between 
evidence and policy is not a linear one based on a traditional ‘black box’ paradigm of 
the policymaking process. The paradigm is based on an doubtful assumption that 
decisions involve trade-offs between competing goals that are known and elucidated 
by a rich and non-contentious supply of policy-relevant evidence. 
 
  
Concluding remarks 
 
There are three wider implications for CT policy that arise. Before discussion of 
these, an important rider was mentioned at the start of the article and needs to be 
reinforced here, namely, there is very little that emerges from this article that limits 
the conclusions to ‘Islamist-inspired terrorism’ (echoing the title of this article). Many 
of the issues and dilemmas are not necessarily untrue of far right-wing-inspired 
terrorism as well. Therefore, there is a distinct possibility that the lessons may also 
be spread beyond the heated confines of Muslims and security. 
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The first implication is that any imperfections or interruptions in the flow of 
reliable data for rational actor purposes should be seen, at least partly, as a 
reflection of how organizations behave and the political-power dynamics at stake. 
For instance, a reliable survey of a target population sub-group (e.g. young Muslim 
men with extremist sympathies) attains value only once it serves the interests and 
motivations of those with responsibility to gather and act upon evidence.  
 
Secondly, the places where organizations operate and political bargaining 
takes place are not neutral settings, and these will contain biases of various kinds 
that promote the collection and use of certain kinds of evidence. For instance, 
operational police forces pursue (and review) policies and programmes that routinely 
balance intelligence-based group targeting against general ethnic profiling. The 
heated politics of targeting and profiling is now a familiar hot button feature of 
policing. 
 
Finally, the arena of political bargaining touches on the CT responsibilities 
assigned to organizations. For example, substantial investments in Prevent inspired 
policies since 2011 have spawned new bureaucratic structures that have penetrated 
into communities, leading to criticism of this approach. The venom has been directed 
to particular parties in the negotiation who have not grasped the mixed signals of 
their involvement. The Prevent programme includes a promotional message to 
parents, schoolteachers, university administrators and others to detect radicalized 
sympathies at an early stage, but it also carries an obligation to report more sinister 
behaviours. The professional practitioner is thus both a promotional and an 
enforcement agent in the eyes of grassroots sceptics. Moreover, there is an 
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important distinction here between the professional policymaker and the professional 
practitioner interest which can be easily conflated. This exposes the effects of 
feedback, co-production and accountability loops that link both as well as the 
effectiveness of such loops in producing credible evidence that carries authority.76 
 
The result is that CT evidence is seen as manipulable to fit each of these 
faces of CT policy, and there are predictable consequences for the reliability of 
evidence that seeks to describe where sympathy for non-violent extremism lies. The 
upshot is a model of science that consciously avoids naivety: recognizing places and 
domains in which it is highly unlikely that objective research (both in design and 
data) is respected in itself.77 
 
As compared with the period before, Muslim non-violent extremism has taken 
more of a centre stage in government CT strategy since 2011. Emphasis now lies on 
the ideas and values that support violent extremism.78 In this climate, generalized 
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sympathy for extremism can be so subjectively grounded in mistrust as to be virtually 
unable to be researched or quantified for its explanatory value. It creates a large, 
now-known limitation on the evidence base. 
 
Finally, it is tempting to think that, despite these limitations, CT policy is fed by 
an evidence base of likely harm, and that wider public understanding of harm follows 
from this. The storm created by President’s Trump’s efforts to introduce group-
specific travel restrictions into the US a week into his administration, suggests 
otherwise.79 Opinion polling on the issue indicates significant public backing for such 
a ban, most likely not founded on known facts about the risks, but rather on a set of 
inner fears about a pariah religious group. For that reason, future evidence gathering 
by CT policymakers might be better informed by an appreciation of public anxieties – 
and how these are anything but irrational to the public. The danger is that shared 
understandings of the sources of terrorism become detached from political 
assessments. Because evidence is branded (i.e. it does not occupy a blank space), 
it cannot be divorced from the politics of extremism and radicalization – which 
includes an astute awareness of the politics of professional policy communities and 
the politics of public opinion. 
 
(7,377 words) 
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